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SOCIAL VULNERABILITY AND PARTICIPATION IN DISASTER 1 
RECOVERY DECISIONS:  2 
Public Housing in Galveston after Hurricane Ike1 3 
Sara Hamideh2 4 
Jane Rongerude 5 
Abstract 6 
In September 2008, Hurricane Ike caused massive damages to Galveston Island’s 7 
residential structures including four public housing developments. These 8 
developments were located in neighborhoods with some of the lowest incomes and 9 
highest percentages of people of color on the Island. Four months later the Galveston 10 
Housing Authority (GHA) decided to demolish all four developments consisting of 11 
569 housing units due to the damages to the buildings. Today, despite federal 12 
regulations requiring reconstruction, court orders mandating replacement of the 13 
demolished units, and available funding, only 142 low income apartments have been 14 
rebuilt. We used the social vulnerability framework to understand these outcomes 15 
through the ability of groups to shape post-disaster recovery decisions. This paper 16 
argues that one of the overlooked characteristic of social vulnerability is a 17 
diminished ability to participate in post-disaster decision-making. We found that 18 
social vulnerability limited participation through three distinct mechanisms: the 19 
physical displacement of public housing residents, the stigmatization of public 20 
housing, and the reduction of residents to housing units in the debates. There were 21 
few local advocates arguing for the preservation of public housing units and even 22 
fewer remaining residents to speak up for themselves in the face of strong local 23 
resistance to the reconstruction of public housing units or the return of public 24 
housing residents. The void of a strong and authentic local pro-public housing 25 
perspective in Galveston provided an opening for various local campaigns to claim 26 
that their desired plan benefited the poor. The disaster recovery became an 27 
opportunity to remove or reduce public housing units and therefore, public housing 28 
residents. Our findings show the dynamic features of vulnerability. While static 29 
factors of vulnerability can limit access to resources for recovery, dynamic processes 30 
of social marginalization and exclusion limit the voices of socially vulnerable groups 31 
in recovery decisions and exacerbate marginalization. 32 
 33 
 34 
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Introduction 35 
On the morning of September 13th 2008, Hurricane Ike crossed between 36 
Galveston Island and Bolivar Peninsula in Texas as a Category 2 storm, causing 37 
$29.5 billion in damage to the Houston-Galveston area, making it one of the costliest 38 
storms in U.S. history (Berg, 2009). The 10 to 15-foot waves generated by the storm 39 
damaged more than 75% of the island’s residential structures including four public 40 
housing developments. These developments were located in neighborhoods with 41 
some of the lowest incomes and highest percentages of people of color on the Island 42 
and had long been viewed by city leaders as a barrier to revitalization. Four months 43 
later the Galveston Housing Authority (GHA) decided to demolish all four 44 
developments consisting of 569 housing units due to the damages to the buildings. 45 
Today, despite federal regulations requiring reconstruction, court orders mandating 46 
replacement of the demolished public housing units, and available funding to finance 47 
reconstruction, only 282 mixed income apartments have been rebuilt with only half 48 
of those set aside as affordable units and less than half of the displaced public 49 
housing families remain on the Island.  50 
Disasters magnify pre-existing social and economic trends in places without 51 
fundamentally changing them (Kates, 1977). The concept of social vulnerability 52 
recognizes that the social inequalities embedded in local sociopolitical systems prior 53 
to a disaster inhibit the ability of different groups of people to cope with and rebound 54 
from disaster events (Blaikie, Cannon, Davis, & Wisner, 1994). As a result, social 55 
vulnerability identifies people who are at greater risk in disasters. It helps explain 56 
how and why residents of public housing, for example, face greater uncertainties and 57 
obstacles for housing recovery than the general population. However, despite the 58 
implicit recognition that pre-disaster conditions shape post disaster outcomes, the 59 
literature has little to say about the relationship between social vulnerability and the 60 
ability of groups to shape post-disaster recovery decisions. This relationship is 61 
especially important for public housing residents whose very ability to remain 62 
housed is contingent on an often tenuous social contract.  63 
Using Galveston as a case study, this paper argues that one overlooked 64 
implication of social vulnerability is a diminished ability to participate in post-65 
disaster decision-making. This implication is in part spatial. Unable to return to their 66 
homes after Hurricane Ike, public housing residents in Galveston scattered across 67 
the region and many found housing off the Island. However, barriers to participation 68 
are also a result of the marginalization inherent to social vulnerability. When a 69 
contentious public process in Galveston revealed strong local resistance to the repair 70 
of public housing units or the return of public housing residents to their communities, 71 
there were few local advocates arguing for the preservation of public housing units 72 
and even fewer remaining residents to speak up for themselves. The marginalization 73 
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of former public housing residents and the absence of a strong and authentic local 74 
pro-public housing perspective provided an opening for various local campaigns to 75 
claim that their desired plan to demolish or diminish public housing in fact benefitted 76 
the former residents. Disaster recovery became an opportunity to remove or reduce 77 
public housing units and therefore, public housing residents. 78 
 79 
Literature Review: Social Vulnerability, Marginalization, and Public Housing 80 
Recovery 81 
Social vulnerability acknowledges that disaster risk is not distributed evenly 82 
across a population or a place. Damage levels, for example, are not simply due to 83 
the force of the hazard agent itself, but are also related to factors such as income, 84 
race/ethnicity, housing type and tenure, and neighborhood characteristics (Maly & 85 
Shiozaki, 2012; Bolin, 1982 & 1985; Bolin & Bolton, 1983 and 1986; Peacock & 86 
Girard, 1997; Van Zandt, Peacock, Henry, Grover, Highfield, & Brody, 2012; 87 
Gotham, 2014; Highfield, Peacock, & Van Zandt, 2014; Peacock et al., 2014). The 88 
relationship between high levels of damage and social vulnerability (Grigsby, 1963; 89 
Myers, 1975) are partly due to the fact that older, lower valued, and poorer quality 90 
homes are more likely to house low-income and minority populations (Van Zandt et 91 
al., 2012; Peacock et al., 2014). Consequently, the physical and social concentration 92 
of damage lead to very different recovery trajectories for housing in lower-income 93 
neighborhoods and communities of color (Chang, 2010; Comerio, 1997; Green, 94 
Bates, & Smyth, 2007; Green & Olshansky, 2012; Zhang, 2012).  95 
   Social vulnerability then contributes not only to greater disaster risk, but to 96 
differentiated post-disaster outcomes (Bolin, 1982 & 1985; Bolin & Bolton, 1983 97 
and 1986; Peacock & Girard, 1997; Van Zandt et al., 2012; Gotham, 2014; 98 
Highfield, et al., 2014; Peacock et al., 2014). When compared to their more affluent 99 
neighbors, low-income households face greater rates of post-disaster displacement, 100 
have more difficulty accessing and navigating the bureaucratic systems that 101 
distribute assistance (Fothergill and Peek, 2004), and are more likely to face 102 
discrimination in the aid distribution process (Aldrich, 2010). Furthermore, the 103 
poverty, exclusion, and marginalization that socially vulnerable groups experience 104 
before a disaster adapts rather than dissipates in the post-disaster context, at times 105 
taking new forms that create additional barriers to accessing recovery services. For 106 
example, Haubert Weil (2009) documented discriminatory housing practices in the 107 
Gulf Coast region after Hurricane Katrina including the rejection of Latinos from 108 
homeless shelters on the presumption that they were newcomers.  109 
Participation in the recovery process provides an opportunity for local 110 
communities to guide post-disaster decision-making. Participatory structures such 111 
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as deliberation and co-production build local capacity, facilitate consensus, and 112 
enable participants to reach a shared sense of a common future (Campenella, 2006; 113 
Murphy. 2007; Chandrasekhar, 2012; Chandrasekhar et al, 2014; Iuchi, 2015; 114 
Vallance, 2015). However, these processes are shaped by pre-existing institutional 115 
structures (Chandrasekhar, 2010) that perpetuate rather than disrupt pre-existing 116 
social and spatial relations. Without deliberate efforts to facilitate inclusion, their 117 
voice is easily diminished or excluded in post-disaster decision-making. 118 
Public housing communities by definition are socially vulnerable. Public 119 
housing in the United States is only available to households with incomes at 30% of 120 
the Area Median Income (AMI) or less. Public housing communities often have 121 
more residents of color and higher concentrations of poverty than the general 122 
population within a given jurisdiction. Furthermore, public housing itself has little 123 
political or public support at the local or federal levels. Since the early 1970s, there 124 
has been a steady national trend of dismantling public housing communities. 125 
Through federal programs such as HOPE VI and Choice Neighborhoods, local 126 
public housing authorities (PHAs) have replaced public housing units with mixed 127 
income developments or household-based subsidies such as the Housing Choice 128 
Voucher. To date, more than 98,592 public housing units have been lost nationally3. 129 
A growing number of rent burdened low income households are competing for a 130 
shrinking number of housing subsidies, leaving a significant segment of low income 131 
households trapped in substandard, overcrowded, and overpriced housing (Kamel, 132 
2012).  133 
Unlike other types of housing, particularly owner-occupied single-family 134 
housing, there is no previously agreed upon course of action for permanent recovery 135 
of public housing after disasters and consequently their fate is open to discussion by 136 
different political agendas. Furthermore, local governments have little economic 137 
incentives for rebuilding and sometimes face great political resistance against 138 
replacing lost affordable housing units. As a result, PHAs have seized the 139 
opportunity to demolish public housing after disasters using emergency disaster 140 
funding (Graham, 2012). The most well-known example of this dynamic comes 141 
from New Orleans where the displaced tenants of public housing developments and 142 
other renters were significantly underrepresented in the city’s and state’s recovery 143 
plans for mixed income replacement despite heavy damage to  rental housing (Clark 144 
& Rose, 2007) and the large proportion of renters in the pre-Katrina housing market.  145 
 Participation in local recovery debates provides the opportunity to shape 146 
housing recovery outcomes. Disadvantaged communities are often more vulnerable 147 
                                                 
3 https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pdredge/pdr-edge-research-032017.html  
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to disaster impacts not just because of the inherent lack of wealth, but because pre-148 
disaster decisions were made about features of risk and vulnerability in these 149 
communities without the input or consent of residents (Dash, Peacock, & Morrow, 150 
1997). Post-disaster, these populations continue to have little access to political 151 
power and often face significant barriers to participating in public recovery 152 
dialogues. The displacement of public housing residents outside their communities 153 
further limits their ability to participate in open forums and enables exclusionary 154 
decision making about recovery. Consequently the fate of public housing residents 155 
is open to public debate and vulnerable to cooptation by local political agendas.  156 
Methods and Data Analysis Techniques  157 
This study began with the question, “Why has public housing not been rebuilt 158 
in Galveston despite court orders and federal regulations requiring the one-for-one 159 
replacement of all lost units?” Research spanning the three and a half years following 160 
Hurricane Ike revealed that public housing recovery did not follow the same 161 
trajectory as other housing typologies.4 As single family, owner-occupied homes, 162 
rental units, and vacation homes were being rebuilt and the communities adjacent to 163 
public housing sites were recovering, public housing languished. The social 164 
vulnerability framework provided tools for understanding the increased risk that 165 
public housing units and residents faced prior to the disaster event, but it was not 166 
sufficient to explain this failure to rebuild.  167 
The case study format provides “an in-depth exploration from multiple 168 
perspectives of the complexity of a particular project policy, institution, programme 169 
[sic] or system in a ‘real life’ context (Simons, 2009, p. 21).” Because it provides 170 
what Yin describes as an average case (2009) where the size, scope, demographics, 171 
and damage experienced by public housing communities were typical of the US 172 
experience, Galveston presents an opportunity to elucidate the complexity and 173 
unique challenges inherent to public housing recovery. While this case is situated in 174 
the US context, it furthers our understanding of social vulnerability and the 175 
experiences of marginalized communities within the recovery process.    176 
This research utilizes two data collection techniques: in-depth interviews and 177 
archival research. The interviews included a total of 18 individuals representing 21 178 
organizations: representatives of three local government agencies, two local NGOs, 179 
two local nonprofit agencies, four churches and charity organizations, two 180 
businesses, two universities, and six local officials. Of the organizations interviewed, 181 
only GHA was focused on public housing. Fourteen of the organizational 182 
interviewees were non-Hispanic white. Four were African American including one 183 
                                                 
4 Sara Hamideh, the first author on this paper, conducted these interviews as part of her dissertation research. See 
Hamideh, 2015. 
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representative of a government agency, two reverends, and one local NGO director. 184 
Eleven interviewees were men and seven were women. Most interviewees were over 185 
the age of 40.  186 
The interviews were all semi-structured, allowing us to gather similar 187 
information from each respondent while also allowing new topics to develop (Berg, 188 
2007; Weiss, 1994). Interviews were designed to take between 30 and 45 minutes 189 
each, but some interviews lasted up to two hours. Interviews were conducted at the 190 
place of the interviewees’ choosing, often their workplace in Galveston. Interviews 191 
were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. The first author wrote detailed 192 
fieldnotes and uploaded these and the transcripts to Atlas.ti software which was used 193 
for qualitative analysis.  194 
 We collected and reviewed 174 documents including Galveston long-195 
term recovery plan, GHA public housing rebuilding plans and annual reports, GHA 196 
press releases, lawsuits, legal complaints, and court orders related to public housing, 197 
newspaper and other forms of media reporting about public housing in Galveston, 198 
professional reports commissioned by Galveston City Council about public housing, 199 
blog posts, video recordings of city council meetings, and video recordings of GHA 200 
press conferences. City Council and GHA board meetings were of particular 201 
importance to our study because they offered the only formal opportunities for 202 
former residents to participate in the debates. We reviewed all of the 205 city council 203 
meeting minutes posted on City of Galveston official website that cover council 204 
meetings between September 2008 and December 2014 and found 24 meetings 205 
during which public housing rebuilding schemes were discussed or issues were 206 
raised with respect to public housing. We also reviewed all of the 83 GHA Board 207 
meeting minutes between January 2010 and December 2014 posted on the GHA 208 
official website and found 23 meetings during which public housing rebuilding 209 
schemes were discussed or issues were raised with respect to public housing. We 210 
uploaded these documents and recordings to the Atlas.ti software for qualitative 211 
analysis.  212 
We coded and recoded the data in three stages (Saldaña, 2009). First, we 213 
performed open coding of basic themes only. Then, we examined relationships 214 
between basic themes, and performed axial coding to connect similar themes 215 
together under larger concepts. Finally, after identifying core concepts from axial 216 
coding, we started selective coding of the data in relationship to these larger ideas. 217 
Working through the data, we generated theoretical memos that highlighted key 218 
issues and their connections in the data. Themes related to the arguments against 219 
rebuilding public housing and arguments for replacing it with mixed-income, 220 
inclusion and participation of former residents, recovery visions and agendas that 221 
involved public housing, and descriptions of former residents and public housing in 222 
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the debates provide the basis for the results discussed below. Our selective coding 223 
focused on understanding whether former residents of public housing were 224 
participating in the debates about rebuilding their homes and how social 225 
vulnerability limited their participation.  226 
 227 
Housing affordability in Galveston 228 
In the past few decades, Galveston’s port activities have declined while beach-229 
related and historical tourism has become the Island’s fastest growing industry 230 
(Angelou Economics, 2008; Gulf & South Atlantic Fisheries Foundation, 2010). 231 
Service jobs are essential for the operation of Galveston’s tourism industry and bring 232 
a significant amount of revenue to the city, however, they are typically low-skill, 233 
low wage work. According to Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics 234 
(LEHD) data, 14.7% of the 34,480 jobs in Galveston in 2008 were in the 235 
accommodation and food services industries which serve the tourism economy. 236 
From all the jobs in the City, 27% earned employees $1250 or less a month. Also, 237 
on a higher estimate, Angelou Economics reported that Galveston’s tourism industry 238 
provided approximately 9,300 or more than 30% of all jobs in the city prior to Ike. 239 
On average, annual earning of employees in Galveston’s tourism sector was only 240 
$20,610 (Angelou Economics, 20085). 241 
 The city did little prior to Ike to address the housing needs of low-wage 242 
earners. During the three-year period before the storm, almost 46% of the renter 243 
households in Galveston were paying more than 30% of their household income for 244 
housing, a threshold used by the Department of Housing and Urban Development 245 
(HUD) to indicate rent burden. More specifically, 90% of the low income6 renters 246 
and 76% of low income homeowners in Galveston spent more than 30% of their 247 
income on housing expenses prior to Hurricane Ike (2007 American Community 248 
Survey 3-Year Estimates). One resident described housing affordability on the 249 
Island before Ike this way:  250 
They [are] only paying you minimum wage for all that, and that's not enough 251 
money to survive on, on this island. For people like me, especially with four 252 
kids, that's not gonna work. You can't survive off of that. That's gonna pay a 253 
light bill. If you got a car that's your gas and lights, and you might not even 254 
have enough gas to get to work for the whole week. (As cited in Nolen et al., 255 
2014) 256 
                                                 
5 Labor and wage calculations were produced using software created by the Minnesota IMPLAN Group (Angelou 
Economics, 2008). 
6 Annual household income less than 20000 
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Since the hurricane of 1900, a 10-mile long, 17’ high seawall has largely 257 
protected residential structures in Galveston during storms. It has also shaped 258 
development on the Island, separating year-round and working class neighborhoods 259 
from seasonal and affluent neighborhoods. The vast majority of Galveston’s year-260 
round residential housing is located behind the seawall in the city’s urban core, 261 
where housing affordability is greater. The median value of owner occupied housing 262 
in the urban core of the city is $122,000, whereas in the Island vacation areas, the 263 
median home price for single family homes is $178,000 (2005-2009 ACS, census 264 
track data). Increasing market demands for vacation housing have pushed 265 
development and investment outside the seawall toward the east and west ends of 266 
the Island. In these areas, 55% of the housing is vacant and over 72% of this vacant 267 
housing is for seasonal or vacation use. In the urban core, 24.9% of the units are 268 
vacant and only 16.8% of those vacancies are due to seasonal or vacation use. 269 
Despite the increasing disinvestment in the urban core neighborhoods, they have 270 
remained a stable and affordable option for the city’s low income residents. 271 
Both housing quality and housing affordability were major issues on the 272 
Island prior to Ike and public housing filled a significant gap in the housing market. 273 
In 2000, 69.2% of the renters in Galveston were very low-, low- or moderate-274 
income7 (GHA, 2008). GHA operated 990 public housing units and 1,213 Section 8 275 
units. Most individuals living in public housing have one or more characteristic of 276 
social vulnerability. From the 850 families that were living in GHA’s public housing 277 
units, 82% were extremely low income, 42% had a disability, 86% had children, 278 
39% were elderly, and 67% were African American, as Table 1 shows. GHA had a 279 
waiting list almost equal to its total number of existing units and vouchers. As Table 280 
2 shows, the year before Ike, a total of 852 families were on the waiting list for public 281 
housing alone, where 93% were extremely low income and 57% were African-282 
American. An additional 824 families were on the Section 8 waiting list with 73% 283 
identified as “extremely low income” and 76% as African-American (GHA, 2008).  284 
 285 
[Table 1 about here] 286 
[Table 2 about here] 287 
 288 
Despite the Island’s substantial affordable housing needs, local leaders had 289 
been attempting to demolish existing public housing since 1980s (Lord, 2011). In 290 
2005, GHA razed Old Palm Terrace, a 228-unit public housing development, and 291 
                                                 
7 Extreme need was determined based on percent of the very low income population that paid more than 30% of 
income for rent. More than 30% of the very low income population were paying more than 30% of income for rent 
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replaced it with The Oaks, a new subdivision with 28 subsidized single-family 292 
homes and 10 duplexes. GHA’s 2008 5-year plan set a goal to increase rental 293 
vouchers, while decreasing the agency’s portfolio of public housing units. GHA 294 
planned to apply to HUD to receive Replacement Housing Factor funding to 295 
demolish and replace units in one of the older complexes, Palm Terrace. Once HUD 296 
funding became available, GHA intended to submit HOPE VI applications for both 297 
Oleander Homes and Palm Terrace Annex to redevelop those sites as mixed-income 298 
developments (GHA, 2008). These projects would have further reduced the city’s 299 
stock of physical public housing units.  300 
 301 
Public housing and displacement after Ike 302 
GHA owned 990 public housing units prior to Ike. Out of those units, 528 apartments 303 
suffered substantial damages from the Hurricane, resulting in the immediate 304 
displacement of 578 households (GHA, 2011). Approximately four months after the 305 
storm, the GHA board decided to raze two large public housing developments 306 
immediately, Oleander Homes and Palm Terrace that made up more than half of 307 
their multifamily units. In addition, the Board proposed the renovation of Cedar 308 
Terrace and Magnolia Homes (GHA, 2009) or the rest of multifamily public housing 309 
units in Galveston. Referring to a HUD website guideline8 regarding accidental 310 
losses and without consulting with the residents, GHA was going to speed up the 311 
demolition9 which would have eliminated all of the 569 multifamily units in the City 312 
without providing permanent replacement housing (Lone Star Legal Aid v. 313 
Galveston Housing Authority, 2013). In response, an advocacy group, Lone Star 314 
Legal Aid (LSLA) filed a complaint with HUD representing displaced residents in 315 
an effort to stop the proposed demolition (Lone Star Legal Aid v. Galveston Housing 316 
Authority, 2009). LSLA requested that GHA create a plan to that protect the rights 317 
of displaced residents during the demolition and rebuilding process (Lone Star Legal 318 
Aid v. Galveston Housing Authority, 2009). LSLA and GHA entered into a 319 
Settlement Agreement with Replacement Plan (also referred to as the Conciliation 320 
Agreement) in March of 2009 (Galveston Housing Authority v. Lone Star Legal Aid, 321 
2009). Under this agreement, GHA committed to rebuild all 569 demolished public 322 
housing units, to provide displaced residents with housing vouchers until rebuilding 323 
was complete, and to guarantee the right of residents to return to the rebuilt units 324 
(LSLA and GHA, 2009b).  325 
 Even though displaced public housing residents were eligible for temporary 326 
vouchers from the Disaster Housing Assistance Program (DHAP), many families 327 
                                                 
8 HUD, Demolition for an Accidental Loss,  
https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_housing/centers/sac/demo_dispo 
9 by March 23, 2009 
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were not able to find an affordable unit where they could use the DHAP subsidy 328 
(Wilder, 2008; Vinogradsky, 2009). Because the displaced population was 329 
disproportionately minority, many households also faced additional burdens created 330 
by unfair housing practices and enduring racial discrimination in the local housing 331 
market. Demolition of these developments intensified the pre-storm shortage of 332 
affordable low income rental housing in Galveston (Oakley & Ruel, 2010). 333 
According to GHA’s 2010-2014 5 year plan, at the time the plan was submitted 334 
2,359 households were on the GHA waiting list for housing assistance (as cited in 335 
LSLA v. GHA, 2013).   336 
The loss of public housing in Galveston after Ike decreased the amount of 337 
affordable housing on the Island; displaced low income residents, especially people 338 
of color; and created disparate outcomes between racial groups. The Kirwan Institute 339 
issued a report in December 2011 detailing the “disparities in population losses” 340 
between white and African-American residents following the Hurricane. According 341 
to that report, the city of Galveston lost 16.5% of its population between 2000 and 342 
2010 with 11.4% loss of White population compared to the 36.7% loss in the African 343 
American community (Reece et al., 2011). We compared the pre-Ike racial-ethnic 344 
composition from 2007 (ACS 3-year) to 2010 to understand how pre-Ike population 345 
trend was exacerbated by the Hurricane. Table 3 presents the absolute and relative 346 
changes in the population of each category along with its aggregate margin of error 347 
(margin of error for the difference).10 The relative change in non-Hispanic Black 348 
population is almost twice the non-Hispanic white population during the three years 349 
following Ike.    350 
 [Table 3 about here] 351 
 352 
Three years after Ike, 217 of the 578 displaced households were still active in 353 
the DHAP program. While some of the displaced residents were able to use those 354 
temporary vouchers or other resources to find housing on the Island (Oakley & Ruel, 355 
2010), a sizeable portion were forced to move outside Galveston or were unable to 356 
find a unit where they could use the temporary DHAP subsidy (Vinogradsky, 2009). 357 
Moreover, DHAP assistance cannot provide permanent housing for displaced 358 
families. Demolition of public housing complexes created a major obstacle against 359 
return and recovery of former residents and other low income renters.  360 
 361 
                                                 
10 We used 2007 (ACS 3-year) to 2010 
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The struggle over rebuilding 362 
The ability of local officials to rebuild public housing and other low to moderate 363 
income housing depends on federal recovery funding, particularly CDBG allocations 364 
by Congress. However, rebuilding also requires support from local officials, which 365 
can be a significant hurdle for public housing. The Action Plans that Texas 366 
Department of Housing and Community Affairs (TDHCA) had developed for 367 
spending CBDG recovery funds gave Councils of Governments (COGs) and local 368 
jurisdictions significant control over prioritizing the needs for spending (TDHCA, 369 
2009a,b) and lacked state oversight to ensure local jurisdictions will rebuild 370 
affordable and government assisted housing lost in Hurricane Ike (TDHCA, 2009b). 371 
Consequently, two housing advocacy groups, the Texas Low-Income Housing 372 
Information Service (TLIHIS) and Texas Appleseed, filed multiple complaints with 373 
HUD in 2009 and 2010 raising concerns about inability of the State to affirmatively 374 
further fair housing in its use of disaster recovery funds and asking HUD to require 375 
revisions of recovery plans in accordance with Fair Housing requirements (TLIHIS 376 
vs. State of Texas, 2009; Texas Appleseed and TLIHIS vs. State of Texas, 2009). 377 
Accepting these concerns, HUD facilitated a conciliation agreement between 378 
advocates and the State requiring Texas to set money aside from the CDBG recovery 379 
funds for TDHCA’s affordable housing programs including public housing. More 380 
specifically, the agreement stated that “no less than $50 million from the TDHCA’s 381 
affordable housing funds shall be available for use in the city of Galveston for the 382 
one for one replacement of all family and elderly public housing units destroyed by 383 
Ike.” (Texas Appleseed and TLIHIS vs. State of Texas, 2010, p16).  384 
Even though state and federal agencies eventually committed funding and 385 
legal commitment to rebuilding, GHA’s demolition decision preceded any local 386 
plans for rebuilding. Initially board members said they hoped to rebuild everything 387 
in two years. Later they committed to a time frame of no more than five years (Evans, 388 
2009). In the years following the demolition, the GHA produced multiple plans for 389 
rebuilding. Each faced persistent and multifaceted local opposition. Each successive 390 
plan reduced the number of public housing units to be rebuilt on the original sites 391 
and increased the number of vouchers and scattered site units (See table 4). With 392 
each plan, the opportunities for displaced housing residents to return to their original 393 
homes diminished. For example, GHA’s 2009 plan proposed replacing 569 public 394 
housing units with 340 apartments, townhomes and duplexes on the four public 395 
housing sites, with another 229 units scattered throughout the city. In 2011, GHA’s 396 
Scattered Sites Initiative increased number of scattered site units to 247 to be located 397 
across Galveston Island in neighborhoods that were not impacted by Hurricane Ike 398 
(GHA, 2011a,b).  399 
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GHA’s 2012 plan, Mixed Income Communities Initiative, limited the 400 
construction of new public housing units at the original sites to mixed income 401 
developments where 51 percent of the units must be public housing and 49 percent 402 
market rate. Consistent with both the federal HOPE VI and Choice Neighborhood 403 
programs, this approach endeavored to use GHA’s rebuilding efforts to revitalize 404 
Galveston’s low income neighborhoods and stimulate private investment. Despite 405 
persistent local opposition to rebuilding any form of government assisted housing, 406 
this last plan ultimately gained support from local authorities. In 2014 construction 407 
of the first mixed income development at the Cedar Terrace site began.  408 
 409 
[Table 4 about here] 410 
The inability to reach an agreement for a rebuilding plan not only extended the 411 
waiting time and uncertainty of return for displaced residents of the demolished 412 
units, it also magnified the unmet housing needs of low income Galvestonians. By 413 
2011 at least 186 displaced households were still waiting to return to Galveston, and 414 
1138 new households were on the public housing waiting list (GHA, 2011). 415 
Nonetheless, debates about the plans largely disregarded the magnitude and 416 
legitimacy of low income housing needs.  417 
 418 
Who speaks for public housing? 419 
Involvement in post-Ike recovery planning was shaped by long standing race- and 420 
class-based differences among Galvestonians. One local advocate for low income 421 
families described the historical exclusion that people of color had experienced in 422 
Galveston and its effect on how they viewed post-disaster planning: 423 
This is what people of color in Galveston, African American people, have been 424 
feeling for years. They have been beat down for so long, that they don't believe 425 
anything good is going to happen... The African American population were 426 
skeptical because they were like they never have done that and it ain't going 427 
to happen, and it didn't. 428 
When low income Galvestonians, and in particular public housing residents, were 429 
given a chance to participate in decision-making, the outcomes were different. For 430 
example, GHA’s initial commitment to rebuild every unit destroyed by Ike at its 431 
original location was based on costs, access to jobs and services, and most 432 
importantly, input from displaced residents (Oakley, Ruel, & Reid, 2010). In sharp 433 
contrast to the Galveston elite and even the general public on the Island, public 434 
housing residents spoke on behalf of the preservation of their homes. 435 
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Worried about the long wait for public housing, local and state housing 436 
advocates raised the issue frequently in city council meetings and in interviews with 437 
local newspapers. For instance, David Miller, president of the National Association 438 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) chapter in Galveston, described 439 
talking to residents every day who wanted to return to the Island but could not 440 
because affordable housing was not available (abcNews, 2012, August 28). Phillips 441 
who led Galveston County Coalition for Justice said in a GHA workshop in 2010 442 
“We didn’t need a court to tell us we need to rebuild our public housing ... We don’t 443 
want to be like New Orleans and wait five years for our new homes but we haven’t 444 
hit a nail yet” (White, 2010). In post-disaster surveys conducted by GHA, public 445 
housing residents expressed a strong desire to return home. 446 
Two months after Ike, local officials initiated a community-based planning 447 
process by forming the Galveston Community Recovery Committee (GCRC) with 448 
300 members. The goals of this large participatory initiative were to unify recovery 449 
efforts, achieve consensus on a recovery vision, and develop a long-term recovery 450 
plan. GCRC was intended to be inclusive and open, however, public housing tenants 451 
had a negligible presence in the committee meetings and many of the approximately 452 
20 African-American participants had to divide their time between the Northside 453 
Galveston Taskforce, a minority advocacy group and GCRC (Lord, 2011). Not 454 
surprisingly, public housing remained marginal to GCRC concerns and discussions, 455 
and the committee’s Long Term Recovery Plan failed to address either public 456 
housing or affordable housing issues.  457 
Social vulnerability and barriers to participation 458 
This study began by asking why the demolished public housing units in Galveston 459 
had not been replaced fully almost a decade after Ike. We were particularly interested 460 
in how the conditions of social vulnerability before the storm contributed to unequal 461 
housing outcomes during recovery. We found that social vulnerability limited 462 
participation through three distinct mechanisms: the physical displacement of public 463 
housing residents, the stigmatization of public housing, and the reduction of 464 
residents to housing units in the debates. 465 
Out of sight, out of mind  466 
The limited presence of former residents in the local public housing debates partially 467 
explains the failure to rebuild public housing. Residents of public housing, 468 
disproportionately African-American and low income, had very limited political 469 
influence in the debates. There was a sense that Galveston’s elite, sometimes referred 470 
to as Born on the Island (BOI) and from wealthier local families, are the only group 471 
who can influence decisions and pursuing their interests in recovery. Although BOI 472 
referred to wealthy locals in the public vernacular, in reality many public housing 473 
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residents were BOI as well, with connections to the Island that went back 474 
generations.  475 
Physical displacement outside the Island significantly limited the ability of 476 
displaced residents to participate in the public housing debates. One of the local 477 
reverends from a church on the North Side, where all four public housing 478 
developments were located, described for us the absence of displaced residents in 479 
debates: 480 
My neighborhood are all gone… And those who are gone can't come back 481 
because there is no transportation … the ones that are going to be affected 482 
the most, are the ones that [can’t come back]... They never went back to get 483 
them. ... You’re stuck. You grab whatever you can take on that bus. … If a 484 
percentage of people who are actually for it [rebuilding public housing], are 485 
not here, who else is going to be back? … Because everybody else is against 486 
it. So if you have more against, and they are the ones who are present … [they] 487 
are the majority … and in a democratic [system] who's going to win that? The 488 
majority. Because you've got the voting power, you've got everything.  489 
After reviewing the discussions during City Council and GHA meetings when 490 
public housing issues were discussed, we found only one instance of a former 491 
resident of the demolished units (self-identified) speaking about replacement of lost 492 
units. As shown in Table 5, during the City Council meetings about public housing 493 
49 people spoke in support of rebuilding either public housing units or in support of 494 
the mixed income scheme. Majority of those people were residents of Galveston that 495 
lived in private housing or in other forms of government assisted housing on the 496 
island such as the elderly housing developments owned by GHA. However, none of 497 
those supporters identified as a former resident. From the 18 people that spoke in 498 
support of public housing during GHA meetings or press conferences, seven were 499 
Galveston residents and two among them were former resident of the demolished 500 
developments who expressed their need for returning home.  501 
 502 
[Table 5 about here]  503 
 504 
When GHA decided to demolish their public housing developments, housing 505 
advocates such as LSLA and TLIHIS became involved. They worked to preserve 506 
the rights and pursue the interest of tenants through legal actions such as the 507 
Conciliation Agreement. That settlement also included an agreement from GHA to 508 
“meet and consult with the displaced tenants’ representative on at least a quarterly 509 
basis regarding the planning and implementation of the demolition and replacement” 510 
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(National Housing Law Project, 2009). Nevertheless, advocates were not always 511 
present or included in local deliberations where some Galveston residents took 512 
strong stands against rebuilding or the construction of mixed income developments 513 
in lieu of public housing. In a strong anti-public housing environment, even victories 514 
of the advocates were difficult to enforce without local political support. For 515 
example, GHA’s 2012 rebuilding plan made a dramatic departure away from the 516 
terms of the Conciliation Agreement. Although the original agreement with HUD 517 
was between GHA and LSLA, the new terms contained in GHA’s 2012 plan were 518 
not negotiated with LSLA and had not been approved by LSLA (LSLA v. GHA, 519 
2013). As a result, even strong advocacy on the behalf of residents was not enough 520 
to fill the void created by the absence of the residents themselves.  521 
 522 
Using stigma to win: move the weak out and let the strong move in  523 
The presence of stigma related to public housing, even post disaster, is well-524 
established. After Katrina, Baton Rouge area GOP Congressman Richard Baker 525 
exulted to the New Orleans Times-Picayune, “We finally cleaned up public housing 526 
in New Orleans…We couldn’t do it, but God did” (Hirsch & Levert, 2009, p. 212). 527 
This stigma is often race and class-based, but also reflects a larger uneasiness with 528 
public housing itself, which has always been marginal within the provisions of the 529 
US welfare state (Hackworth, 2006).  530 
Even though public housing residents suffered disaster losses, they were often 531 
not considered equally deserving of the right to return home as other Galvestonians. 532 
Opponents of rebuilding used the negative perceptions of public housing to put their 533 
return against successful recovery for the Island. Several interviewees and local 534 
reporters connected opposition to rebuilding public housing to racism. Based on the 535 
high percentage of people of color in GHA’s public housing developments and on 536 
the waiting list, they described GHA’s failure to replace all demolished units as a 537 
continuation of racial exclusion and discrimination. According to the former chair 538 
of a local philanthropic organization,  539 
… [R]ight after the storm, some people thought that "this is great, we got rid 540 
of all this blighted ugly places, let's just not bring it back. And that has 541 
degenerated into a racist classist conversation that is very unpleasant.  542 
Petitions and campaigns for blocking GHA rebuilding plans with comments 543 
like the followings demonstrate that racial and class-based stigmas played a role in 544 
objecting to public housing recovery.  545 
“The island is a tourist destination and the public housing unfortunately was 546 
linked with crime, prostitution, drugs, vagrancy, public drunkenness and 547 
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loitering in city streets. People felt unsafe especially at night in some areas... 548 
Galveston was a dump before Ike and will be a dump after Ike if it is not cleaned 549 
up and the people removed that are sucking the life out of the island.” (As cited 550 
in TLIHIS and Texas Appleseed v. State of Texas, 2009). 551 
One of the leading local voices against rebuilding described the return of 552 
public housing residents in this way, “this is lose-lose. These people are low income 553 
minorities getting here, they have a bad life. It’s bad for all of us. Because they don’t 554 
do well they get into crime and things like that.” Such stigmas were perceived by 555 
displaced residents as tools for exclusion. A former resident of Cedar Terrace 556 
described active opposition against rebuilding as a method of excluding low income 557 
people from the future of the Island: “They want the people who’ve lived here the 558 
majority of their lives to stay out. They want the tourists to come back. Move the 559 
weak out and let the strong move in (As cited in Wilder, 2008).” 560 
Disaster victims reduced to housing units 561 
Displaced and stigmatized public housing residents had little standing in many of 562 
the heated arguments both for and against rebuilding. These arguments tended to 563 
focus on the benefits or losses that Galveston as a whole would experience from 564 
replacing public housing units; whereas benefits and losses to the displaced residents 565 
were often absent from the debates. This subtle distinction is important. In this 566 
discourse, displaced residents were reduced to housing units. The debate over 567 
rebuilding became a disagreement over the number and type of units to be 568 
constructed rather than returning residents to their homes. The people themselves, 569 
already marginalized because of their poverty, race, and housing tenure before Ike, 570 
were further dehumanized and marginalized after the disaster in the face of broader 571 
concerns over the strength of the local housing market and the economic well-being 572 
of the city. 573 
Much of the debates over rebuilding public housing was concerned with its 574 
benefits to housing market in Galveston instead of displaced residents. One of the 575 
arguments used against proposals to rebuild subsidized housing was that the high 576 
percentage of vacant properties before the storm meant that there was no demand for 577 
new affordable housing units in Galveston. Opponents suggested that “The agency 578 
[GHA] should consider whether it’s appropriate to rebuild any subsidized housing 579 
on an island with so much vacant property (TLIHIS and Texas Appleseed v. State 580 
of Texas, 2009).” While vacancy rate was approximately 30% before Hurricane 581 
Ike11, it was noted by housing advocates and local planners that such high vacancy 582 
did not necessarily reflect oversupply of habitable and available rental properties. A 583 
                                                 
11 According to 2007 3-year ACS residential vacancy was estimated at 28.9% with a margin of error of 2.4%. 
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sizeable proportion of vacant properties were either not well-maintained or were 584 
only available for occasional rent in the tourist seasonal rental market.  585 
One common perspective against rebuilding expressed concern with the well-586 
being of Galveston’s private multifamily rental housing market and argued that 587 
because multifamily landlords and developers suffered losses from Ike they could 588 
not compete in price and quality with mixed income developments funded by tax 589 
dollars. These free market proponents argued that it should be private developers 590 
creating affordable housing in Galveston, not public entities such as the GHA 591 
(Oakley & Ruel, 2010). But housing market in Galveston was expanding high end 592 
vacation home developments, and clearly failed or were not interested in providing 593 
affordable housing for both middle income and lower income households.  594 
One of the long-standing proposals from the removal campaign was giving 595 
displaced residents vouchers so they can decide whether to live in Galveston 596 
__where opponents claimed job opportunities are scarce __or elsewhere with more 597 
job opportunities and lower risk of hurricanes. According to Lewis Rosen, who ran 598 
for Mayor in 2012 promising to block rebuilding plans, "The Housing Authority 599 
should not be in the business of building homes, especially where we don't have job 600 
opportunities for people. We need to provide housing for people who have the 601 
opportunity to move where the jobs are. And we can do that through vouchers." (As 602 
cited in Pitman, 2012). However, without quality affordable housing in Galveston 603 
or nearby, vouchers would have failed at providing meaningful choice for displaced 604 
residents, especially those employed in low wage tourism jobs on the Island (Smith, 605 
2012). 606 
Public housing rebuilding plans were often evaluated based on goals other 607 
than helping displaced residents. When GHA changed their rebuilding plan in 608 
2011—increasing the number of market rate and scattered site units and reducing 609 
the number of public housing units at the original sites—the mayor at the time was 610 
leading a push to attract middle income professionals and revitalize the city. He 611 
argued that replacing public housing with mixed income developments would help 612 
both the city and low income residents, “[Hurricane Ike] gave the city a rare 613 
opportunity to start fresh by bulldozing projects that … shouldn't have been around 614 
as long as they were (Pitman, 2012).” Some business interests also saw mixed 615 
income developments in the downtown area as an opportunity to attract more tourists 616 
to Historic Downtown and facilitate economic development. A downtown-seaport 617 
partnership expressed interest in collaborating with GHA to redevelop Magnolia 618 
Homes as part of a larger push to improve downtown “by putting into the mix 619 
opening up the streets so it’s not a fortress and is walkable and livable (White, 620 
2010).” 621 
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To the extent that the interests of public housing residents were present in this 622 
debate, it was focused on ways that redevelopment might provide them with a 623 
different, and therefore better future. Supporters argued that these communities 624 
would provide low income residents with new opportunities to climb out of poverty. 625 
They frequently referenced successful mixed income developments in places like 626 
Atlanta and New Orleans, but made little mention of the small percentages of public 627 
housing residents that returned after construction (Graham, 2012). With the debate 628 
focused on new construction, advocates for public housing residents were left with 629 
the reality of further delays before displaced residents would return to Galveston. As 630 
one advocate stated, “I’ll bet you a nickel that 24 months from today there will not 631 
be a shovel turned (As cited in Smith, 2012).” 632 
Interests of displaced residents were of secondary importance and 633 
misrepresented in the local public housing debates. The lack of meaningful 634 
participation from former residents allowed mixed income proponents to present 635 
their plan as the only solution that can benefit the poor. The removal campaign often 636 
argued against bringing displaced residents back to hazard-prone and low 637 
opportunity neighborhoods of Galveston. In a petition against rebuilding public 638 
housing on the Island signed by more than 2000 people, some people expressed 639 
concerns related to flood risk: “The Island is in a flood zone and is not an 640 
appropriate place for public housing as everyone has seen after Hurricane Ike. 641 
Building structures on the island is more costly because of hurricane building 642 
standards and insurance is much more costly. Evacuating low income residents is 643 
costly and dangerous to everyone involved.”(As cited in Stanton, 2009). The 644 
removal policy agenda often ignored possibility of using effective building and 645 
design strategies that can mitigate risk of hazards particularly hurricanes to residents 646 
of coastal areas, high or low income. In addition, the same group rarely discussed 647 
implications of high risk of hurricanes on the Island for bringing back private 648 
homeowners or other recovery projects in Galveston.  649 
 650 
Conclusion: vulnerable not only to disasters but also to local politics aimed at 651 
eliminating affordable housing 652 
Galveston provided a revealing case to understand lack of representation for 653 
vulnerable population in recovery because a large proportion of the poor were 654 
physically displaced outside the barrier island. Our study shows that being 655 
vulnerable means more than living in hazardous areas and having limited access to 656 
recovery resources. It also implies less control and representation in decisions about 657 
one’s recovery. Hence making recovery of those people a political contest as what 658 
is in the best interest of the city rather than what is in the best interest of residents. 659 
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Consequently, displaced residents of public housing are not seen as disaster victims 660 
like everyone else, but as the government assisted units they lived in. Rebuilding 661 
that unit is the issue of discussion rather than supporting displaced residents to 662 
recover. 663 
Without adequate affordable housing in Galveston, public housing residents 664 
were forced to move away from established roots and out of the city of Galveston. 665 
The burden of GHA’s conduct fell disproportionately on people of color and on 666 
families with children (LSLA v. GHA, 2013). The effects of this population decline 667 
is evident in local community centers in African-American neighborhoods. Burkley, 668 
the pastor of Mt. Olive Missionary Baptist Church, an African-American 669 
congregation near the former public housing sites and many Ike-damaged abandoned 670 
rental homes described this loss as a race and class issue: 671 
“I'm suffering big time. Members that I had were all gone. We have a smaller 672 
number of members at church. You just can't make the determination and say we're 673 
not going to let this group of people come back. Because they are the worst set of 674 
folks.” 675 
Although housing advocates were vocal against both removal of public 676 
housing and mixed income schemes, they had little influence in local recovery 677 
debates. In the local representation vacuum from displaced residents as the main 678 
stakeholders of public housing debates, several agendas filled the void by proposing 679 
plans and claiming to be pursuing the best for those residents and the city. Our 680 
analysis shows how lack of representation and stigmas attached to this vulnerable 681 
population provided an opportunity to pursue different plans without considering 682 
their impacts on displaced residents.  683 
This study highlights the importance of understanding social vulnerability as 684 
a process. One of the significant implications of our findings is the dynamic features 685 
of vulnerability. While static factors like poverty can limit a household’s resources 686 
for recovery, dynamic processes of social marginalization and exclusion after 687 
disasters limit the voice of socially vulnerable groups in recovery decisions. Socially 688 
vulnerable populations face significant barriers in participating in post-disaster 689 
discourse and as a result, face even greater barriers to housing recovery. This study 690 
demonstrated that while it is important that all groups have access to and can 691 
influence recovery decisions, it is even more important to secure that access and 692 
influence for groups that are targeted for elimination through deliberate policies. 693 
Considering the growing risk of disasters in many parts of the US, protecting 694 
residents of affordable housing from both the disasters and discriminatory processes 695 
that follow is crucial. 696 
 697 
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Table 1 Families in the GHA Public Housing Units, 2008 960 
  # of families % of total families 
 Total # of families 852  
Extremely low income (<=30% AMI) 694 82% 
Very low income (>30% but <=50% 
AMI) 
128 15% 
Low income (>50% but <80% AMI) 23 3% 
Families with children 727 86% 
Elderly families 325 39% 
Families with Disabilities 359 42% 
Race/ethnicity  
1. White 
 
274 
 
32% 
2.  Black 573 67% 
3.  Native American  9 1% 
4.  American Asian 0 0% 
Source: GHA 5 year Plan for FFU 2008 -2012 (GHA FFY 2009 – 2013) 
  961 
 962 
Table 2 Families on the Public Housing and the Section 8 Tenant-based Assistance Waiting List, 963 
2008 964 
 965 
  966 
 Public Housing Section 8 
 # of 
families 
% of total 
families 
# of 
families 
% of total 
families 
Waiting list total 852  824  
Extremely low income  
(<=30% AMI) 
790 93% 598 73% 
Very low income 
(>30% but <=50% AMI) 
56 7% 182 22% 
Low income 
(>50% but <80% AMI) 
5 .6% 361 4% 
Families with children 395 46% 324 40% 
Elderly families* 17 2% 1 .2% 
Families with Disabilities 114 13.38% 15 2% 
Race/ethnicity 
1. White 
 
331 
 
39% 
 
183 
 
22% 
2.  Black 487 57%  629 76% 
3.  Native 
American  
12 1.4% 4 .5% 
4.  American Asian 1 0.1% 1 .1% 
Sources: GHA 5 year Plan for FFU 2008 -2012 (GHA FFY 2009 – 2013)   
29 
 
Table 3 Change in population composition after Hurricane Ike 967 
 
Absolute change 
ACS 2007-ACS 2010 MOE 
% change 
 ACS 2007-ACS 
2010 
Total -4961 ±2568 -9.2% 
Hispanic  631 ±2433   4.2% 
Not-Hispanic White -2967 ±2146 -11.8% 
Not-Hispanic Black -2367 ±1723 -22.0% 
Not-Hispanic other  -258   ±917   -8.7% 
 968 
 969 
Table 4 GHA replacement plans 970 
GHA Plan 
year 
New 
units 
On the same 
footprints 
Scatter-site 
2009  1,500   
2009 569  390  179 
2009 569 340 229 
2011   247 
2011 mixed 
income 
569 51% public /49% 
market  
 
2012 mixed 
income 
141 51% public /49% 
market  
288 in Galveston; 
100 Off the Island  
 971 
 972 
Table 5 people speaking in support of rebuilding public housing, 2008-2014 973 
Public Meetings Total # people 
speaking  
# Galveston 
residents  
# former public 
housing 
residents  
# organizations 
rep. or officials  
Galveston City 
Council 
49 31 0 18 
Galveston 
Housing 
Authority 
18 7 2 9 
30 
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